数字平台定价与数据隐私激励OA

The advancement of big data,artificial intelligence,and other technologies has prompted platforms to implement price discrimina-tion and exacerbate consumer data privacy loss.This paper examines the marginal distribution of consumer data privacy loss and the net residu-al change of consumers when platforms adopt nonlinear contracts to obtain user data privacy.This study aims to provide policy support for plat-form anti-monopoly supervision and data privacy protection.Based on the results of structural estimation and counterfactual inference,it is found that the marginal distribution of data privacy loss at points of high curvature indicates a strong incentive for discrimination by the plat-form,with more frequent consumer transactions leading to higher data privacy loss.Additionally,it is observed that when the platform adopts linear pricing,consumer surplus is relatively high;however,when consumers do not conceal their behavior,the platform captures all consumer surplus.