基于古巴导弹危机的模糊信号博弈研究OACHSSCD
An Ambiguous Signaling Game Study of the Cuban Missile Crisis
[目的]模糊信号是指国际行为体在对外政策或沟通中,有意识发出的具有多义性、使得接收方难以进行准确解读的信号.研究模糊信号的威慑机制,能够为情报信号评估、威慑战术制定和国际危机管理提供启示.[方法]采用档案研究与过程追踪等方法,分析美苏两国决策者在古巴导弹危机中的信号博弈,能够解释模糊信号是如何实现威慑的.[结果/结论]模糊信号的威慑机制认为,在威慑施动者发出模糊信号后,受动者会对此进行解读.从理性选择视角来看,决策者无法确知威慑惩罚,导致其难以确保改变现状的期望效用更大,因而改变现状的选择无法完全压倒维持现状的选择.从决策心理的视角来看,决策者倾向于将当前未被惩罚的现状框定为收益,表现出风险规避,因而倾向于高估严重惩罚,畏惧过高损失.这就放大了决策者维持现状的倾向,最终将决策结果导向了放弃改变现状,从而使施动者实现成功威慑.
[Purpose]Ambiguous signals refer to equivocal signals that international actors consciously send out in their foreign policy or communication,which are difficult for the recipient to interpret accurately.Studying the deterrence mechanism of ambiguous signals can provide insights for intelligence signal assessment,deterrence tactics formulation,and international crisis management.[Method]Emplo-ying methods such as archival research and process tracing to analyze the signaling game between U.S.and Soviet decision-makers during the Cuban Missile Crisis can explain how ambiguous signals achieved deterrence.[Result/Conclusion]The deterrence mechanism of am-biguous signals operates as follows:after the deterrer issues ambiguous signals,the target interprets them.From a rational choice perspec-tive,as decision-makers cannot ascertain the specific punishment of deterrence,they find it difficult to be certain that the expected utility of changing the status quo is greater.Consequently,the choice to change the status quo cannot completely outweigh the choice to maintain it.From a decision-making psychology perspective,decision-makers tend to frame the unpunished status quo as a reference point for gains,which induces risk aversion.This leads them to overestimate the severity of potential punishment and fear excessive losses.This psychological bias reinforces the inclination to maintain the status quo,ultimately resulting in a decision to forgo any attempt to change it,thereby enabling the deterrer to achieve success.
单清宇
同济大学政治与国际关系学院 上海 200092
社会科学
模糊信号威慑机制信号博弈决策心理古巴导弹危机
ambiguous signalsdeterrence mechanismsignaling gamedecision-making psychologyCuban missile crisis
《情报杂志》 2026 (4)
20-28,48,10
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