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"量质双升":经营投资问责对国有企业投资的影响OACHSSCD

"Dual Improvement in Quantity and Quality":The Impact of Accountability for Operation and Investment on the Investment in State-Owned Enterprises

中文摘要英文摘要

经营投资问责是强制性政府监管的重要创新举措,其如何影响国有企业投资是值得关注的重要问题.以经营投资问责政策的实施为准自然实验构建多期双重差分模型,采用沪深A股上市公司2013-2023 年的数据分析发现:经营投资问责显著促进了国有企业投资"量质双升"(即投资规模扩大和投资机会敏感度提升);经营投资问责可以通过提高管理层勤勉程度和缓解信息不对称扩大国有企业投资规模,通过缓解信息不对称和提高内部控制质量提升国有企业投资质量;经营投资问责的投资"量质双升"效应在内源融资能力较弱、供应链话语权较小的国有企业以及政府数字化治理水平较高地区的国有企业中更加显著;经营投资问责对国有企业投资的改善会进一步促进国有企业价值创造.因此,监管部门应优化经营投资问责制度,以追责促整改,问责与容错并举,充分发挥经营投资问责的正向激励作用;国有企业应强化责任追究意识,积极改善信息环境和治理环境,持续推动投资"量质双升".

State-owned enterprises are a vital component of the state sector.Promoting both a reasonable increase in the quantity and an effective improvement in the quality of state-owned enterprise investment is key to leveraging the catalytic and multiplier effects of investment.Accountability for operation and investment is an accountability system established by state-owned asset supervision authorities at all levels,targeting the operational and investment acts of state-owned enterprises.However,as a major innovative measure of mandatory government regulation,how accountability for operation and investment affects the investment level of state-owned enterprises and whether it can promote reasonable investment growth have not been fully examined in the literature;research on its impact on the quality of state-owned enterprise investment also lacks an in-depth exploration of the underlying mechanisms. This study utilizes a sample of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2013 to 2023.By leveraging the exogenous shocks from the staggered implementation of accountability supervision policies across regions,a multi-period difference-in-differences model is constructed to systematically examine the regulatory effect of accountability for operation and investment on both the investment scale and quality of state-owned enterprises.Research finds that accountability for operation and investment can promote"dual improvement in quantity and quality"of state-owned enterprise investment,manifesting as a significant increase in investment levels and a substantive enhancement in investment quality in state-owned enterprises.Mechanism analysis demonstrates that accountability for operation and investment can enhance the investment levels of state-owned enterprises by improving management diligence and alleviating information asymmetry,and can improve the investment quality of state-owned enterprises by alleviating information asymmetry and enhancing internal control quality.Heterogeneity analysis based on differences in the characteristics of regulatory objects and subjects finds that the impact of accountability for operation and investment on the level and quality of investment in state-owned enterprises is more obvious in samples with poor internal financing capacity,low supply chain bargaining power,and high digital construction levels of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.Economic consequences indicate that accountability for operation and investment enhancing the investment levels and investment quality of state-owned enterprises can effectively promote value creation. Compared with the existing literature,this study makes extensions in the following two aspects:First,by investigating both the quantity and quality of state-owned enterprise investment,this study provides more comprehensive empirical evidence on the effectiveness of accountability for operation and investment and expands the theoretical literature on accountability regulation at the financial level.Second,from the perspectives of managerial behavior and the organizational environment,this study systematically uncovers the mechanisms through which accountability for operation and investment affects the investment scale and quality of state-owned enterprises.This provides a deeper logical foundation for understanding this relationship and strengthens the theoretical comprehension of how government regulation influences the intrinsic mechanisms of corporate investment decisions. The findings also hold significant practical implications.This study focuses on the relationship between accountability for operation and investment and state-owned enterprise investment,systematically analyzing variation in effects based on the characteristics of both the regulatory objects and subjects.The findings not only offer important insights for regulatory authorities in differentially advancing the accountability system,optimizing the government regulatory framework,and enhancing regulatory effectiveness,but also provide decision-making references for how to promote the"dual improvement in quantity and quality"of state-owned enterprise investment and fully leverage the catalytic and multiplier effects of investment from the perspective of government regulation.

白玮东;郭振雄

山西师范大学 经济与管理学院,山西 太原 030031山西财经大学 会计学院,山西 太原 030006

管理科学

强制性监管投资规模投资质量投资机会管理层勤勉程度信息不对称内部控制

mandatory regulationinvestment scaleinvestment qualityinvestment opportunitymanagement diligenceinformation asymmetryinternal control

《西部论坛》 2026 (1)

55-69,15

国家社会科学基金一般项目(24BJY064)山西省研究生教育创新项目(2023KY494)

10.3969/j.issn.1674-8131.2026.01.005

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