基于三方Stackelberg博弈的区域制冷需求响应策略OA
District cooling demand response strategy based on tripartite Stackelberg game
针对商业综合体空调负荷需求响应中用户参与度低、激励策略粗放等问题,提出融合三方Stackelberg博弈与深度学习的动态定价模型.首先,设计电网-聚合商-用户三级层级决策框架,利用神经网络挖掘用户负荷削减量和激励电价的非线性函数.其次,构建聚合商利润-风险均衡模型,引入达标率弹性约束下的惩罚机制和电网成本函数.然后,寻找最优补贴价格和负荷削减量,优化电网需求响应补贴策略.最后,以某商业综合体为实证对象,结果表明,所提模型负荷削减达标率为94.2%,用户舒适度偏离度降低至 0.86,电网调峰成本优化 57.14%.研究为高耗能建筑需求响应提供了兼具博弈均衡性与行为可解释性的决策工具,助力新型电力系统资源协同调控.
To address such issues as low user participation and coarse incentive strategies in demand response of air-conditioning loads in commercial complexes,a dynamic pricing model integrating tripartite Stackelberg game and deep learning is proposed.Firstly,a three-level hierarchical decision frame-work of power grid-aggregator-user is designed,and a neural network is used to mine the nonlinear function of user load reduction and incentive electricity price.Secondly,an aggre-gator profit-risk equilibrium model is constructed,and a penalty mechanism and power grid cost function under the elastic constraint of compliance rate are introduced.And then,the optimal subsidy price and load reduction are identified to optimize the subsidy strategy of power grid demand response.Finally,taking a commercial complex as an empirical case,the results show that the proposed model achieved a 94.2%load reduction compliance rate,reduced the user comfort deviation to 0.86,and optimized the peak-shaving cost of the power grid by 57.14%respectively.This study provides a decision-making tool that integrates game-theoretic equilibrium and behavioral interpretability for demand response in energy-intensive buildings,facilitating coordinated resource regulation in new-type power systems.
余君一;廖思阳;柯德平
武汉大学 电气与自动化学院,湖北 武汉 430072武汉大学 电气与自动化学院,湖北 武汉 430072武汉大学 电气与自动化学院,湖北 武汉 430072
区域制冷系统三方博弈需求响应纳什均衡电力市场
district cooling systemtripartite gamedemand responsenash equilibriumelectricity market
《中国电力》 2026 (2)
24-36,13
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.52477119). 国家自然科学基金资助项目(52477119).
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