CPM4DA:基于双向拍卖的防串谋机制研究OA

Double auctions are highly effective mechanisms for incentivizing various systems and markets.However,existing research on double auctions has primarily focused on designing collusion-proof mechanisms that involve just one side of the market—either buyers or sellers.This approach falls short in adequately handling scenarios where both buyers and sellers conspire collectively,significantly impairing the fairness of resource allocation outcomes.Therefore,we delve into the underlying motivations driving collusion among players(both sellers and buyers)in double auctions.Adopting an innovative approach,we define a collusion strategy as one that aims to increase the utilities of players within a coalition while simultaneously diminishing the utilities of those outside the coalition.This perspective forms the cornerstone of our efforts to deter collusion and develop a collusion-proof mechanism.With the primary objective of optimizing resource allocation,we have developed the Collusion Proof Mechanism for Double Auctions(CPM4DA).This mechanism has been designed to reduce the likelihood of collusion among market players and ensure fairness in resource allocation.The CPM4DA has been examined through theoretical analysis and proof,demonstrating its ability to meet essential game theoretic attributes such as collusion proof,incentive compatibility,individual rationality,and weak budget balance.Moreover,we have conducted simulation experiments to compare the performance of CPM4DA with existing collusion-proof mechanisms in the spectrum market.The results demonstrate that CPM4DA excels in payment coefficient consistency,allocation efficiency,and collusion proof,which can improve the fairness of market pricing and reduce the motivation of collusion among players.Our research findings establish the theoretical and technical groundwork for the development of collusion proof mechanisms in double auctions.