基于计算实验的重大工程风险管理激励效率演化分析OA

In response to the high-risk exposure in mega projects and considering the potential role of insurance institutions in onsite risk management,this paper develops a multi-period incentive model for owners and contractor groups under the participation of insurance institutions.Based on a computational experimental approach,it simulates the evolution of risk management behaviors of different stakeholders under various scenarios,exploring the effects of fairness preferences,incentive mechanisms,and insurance participation on the efficiency of risk management incentives.The results indicate that the fairness preference of contractors significantly impacts incentive effectiveness.Dynamic incentives implemented by owners and insurance institutions are significantly more effective than static,constant incentives.Proactive participation by insurance institutions effectively promotes the risk management efforts of mega projects,enhancing the payoffs of all parties involved.These findings offer new theoretical insights and decision-making guidance for risk management in mega projects.