考虑溢出效应的双寡头绿色研发时机选择OA

As consumers increasingly prefer green energy-efficient products,enterprises engage in green research and development(R&D)to improve the environmental performance of their products and strengthen market competitiveness.However,because green R&D exhibits spillover effects,competitors can easily learn from or imitate these efforts,reducing their won R&D costs.Some competitors may even"leapfrog"and achieve an advantage in product greenness.This creates a dilemma for firms:should they engage in green R&D early to gain a first-mover advantage,or should they wait and benefit from competitors'spillovers?To address problem,this paper develops a two-period duopoly game model.The results show that the there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the timing of green R&D.When the spillover rate is low,the duopolies choose to conduct green R&D in the first period.However,the equilibrium profit in this scenario is lower than if they conduct R&D in the second period,creating a classic prisoner's dilemma.When the spillover rate is high,the duopolies choose to conduct green R&D at different periods.In this case,the firm that invests first achieves higher profits and exerts greater R&D effort than the later firm.As the spillover rate increases,the first-mover's profit and R&D effort gradually decline,while the second-mover's profit and effort increase.Furthermore,in the scenario where the two firms conduct R&D in different periods,a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium also exists.In this case,the probability that each firm conducts green R&D in the second period increases with the spillover rate.