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政府补贴下绿色供应链的竞争与合作研究OA

Research on Competition and Cooperation in Green Supply Chain Under Government Subsidies

中文摘要英文摘要

在全球碳排放总量不断增加、绿色供应链各参与主体博弈关系错综复杂的背景下,研究如何在绿色供应链的竞争与合作并存格局中达成经济与环境效益的双赢,显得尤为关键.本文以新能源汽车为例,构建由供应商、制造商、消费者所组成的存在政府补贴的供应链模型,基于非合作-合作两型博弈理论,采用Stackelberg均衡与Shapley值的理论,揭示了绿色供应链间价格竞争与技术协同的交互机制.结果表明,政府提供的研发补贴与生产补贴对供应链的定价决策与利润分配具有明显的差异化影响.研发补贴虽然能有效提升绿色技术创新水平,但过高补贴存在边际效益递减效应;生产补贴则可稳定促进市场需求的持续扩张并提高供应链整体利润,因此政府应根据供应链的发展阶段合理设置补贴强度.

Against the backdrop of continuously increasing global carbon emissions and complex game relationships among various participants in the green supply chain,it is particularly crucial to study how to achieve a win-win situation for economic and environmental benefits in the competitive and cooperative landscape of green supply chains.Taking new energy vehicles as an exam-ple,this paper constructs three supply chain models consisting of suppliers,manufacturers and consumers with government subsi-dies and based on the non-cooperative-cooperative game theory,adopts the Stackelberg equilibrium and Shapley's value theory to reveal the relationship between the green supply chain and the green supply chain.theory,the interaction mechanism of price com-petition and technology synergy among green supply chains is revealed.It is found that R&D subsidies and production subsidies pro-vided by the government have obvious differentiated impacts on the pricing decision and profit distribution of the supply chain:al-though R&D subsidies can effectively enhance the level of green technological innovation,there is a diminishing marginal benefit effect of over-subsidization;whereas production subsidies can stably promote the continuous expansion of market demand and in-crease the overall profit of the supply chain,so the government should set the subsidy intensity according to the stage of the supply chain's development.Therefore,the government should set the subsidy intensity reasonably according to the development stage of the supply chain.

赵璇;李艳轩

北京工商大学计算机与人工智能学院,北京 102488北京工商大学商学院,北京 102488

管理科学

非合作-合作两型博弈政府补贴绿色供应链绿色技术创新成本分担新能源汽车研发补贴生产补贴

non-cooperative-cooperative two-type gamegovernment subsidiesgreen supply chainsgreen technological innovationcost sharingnew energy vehiclesR&D subsidiesproduction subsidies

《工业技术经济》 2026 (2)

43-55,13

10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2026.02.005

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