分析乘客的订单取消行为并制定合理的惩罚策略是网约车公司运营优化的重要问题.本文基于理性疏忽理论,研究网约车和出租车共存的市场中,乘客的订单取消行为和公司对乘客取消订单的惩罚策略.不同于现有完美信息或者完全无信息的假设,本文考虑乘客自主选择信息策略并基于获取的信息做出决策,建立了双层优化模型.上层分别以公司利益和网约车市场的社会福利最大化为优化目标,确定取消订单的惩罚金额.下层构建了基于理性疏忽理论的用户决策模型,并比较了固定费用、分段和基于时间三种惩罚策略的特点.通过粒子群优化算法和逐次平均法相结合的方法求解该模型.研究表明,随着信息获取成本的降低,单个出行者的出行成本最多降低8%,做出正确决策的概率最多增加40%.同时随着信息获取成本的增加,最优的公司收益和社会福利分别减少了16.8%和5.1%.在公司收益和社会福利最优的目标下三种惩罚策略几乎无差别,但在公司收益最大化时,惩罚金额显著高于在社会福利最优时的水平,且订单取消率更低.研究结果为网约车公司制定惩罚策略提供了参考性思路和实践价值.
Analyzing passengers'order cancellation behavior and formulating appropriate penalty strategies are crucial issues in optimizing the operations of ride-sourcing companies.This study in-vestigates the order cancellation behavior of passengers and the penalty strategies employed by com-panies in the coexisting market of ride-sourcing and taxi servicesbased on the theory of rational inat-tention.In contrast to existing assumptions of perfect information or complete lack of information,this study considers passengers'autonomous selection of information strategies and decisionmaking based on the acquired information,thereby establishing a two-level optimization model.At the upper level of the model,the optimization objectives of maximizing company profits and social welfare are separately pursued to determine the penalty amount for order cancellations.At the lower level,a user decision-making model based on the theory of rational inattention is constructed,and the characteris-tics of three penalty strategies,namely the fixed fee,segmented,and time-based penalties,are com-pared.The model is solved using a combination of the particle swarm optimization algorithm and the method of successive averages.The research findings indicate that reducing the cost of information acquisition can potentially lead to a maximum reduction of 8%in individual travelers'costs and a maximum increase of 40%in the probability of making the right decision.Furthermore,as the cost of information acquisition increases,optimal company profits and social welfare decrease by 16.8%and 5.1%,respectively.Under the objective of optimizing company profits and social welfare,the three penalty strategies exhibit negligible differences.However,when maximizing company profits,the penalty amount is significantly higher than that under the objective of optimizing social welfare,resulting in a lower order cancellation rate.The study provides valuable insights and practical impli-cations for ride-sourcing companies in formulating penalty strategies.
蒋格格;张欣;李曼姿
中山大学·深圳,智能工程学院,深圳 518107||中山大学,广东省智能交通系统重点实验室,广州 510275香港科技大学,土木与环境工程系,香港
经济学
城市交通;订单取消惩罚策略;理性疏忽;网约车;信息策略
urban traffic;ordercancellation penalty;rational inattention;ride-sourcing;information strategy
《交通运输工程与信息学报》 2024 (001)
175-190 / 16
国家自然科学基金项目(72201285);深圳市高等院校稳定支持计划项目(202206193000001,20220817200513001);广东省科技计划项目(2023B1212060029);
10.19961/j.cnki.1672-4747.2023.10.036
评论