基于三方演化博弈的林长制横向协作机制研究
Research on the Operation Mechanism of Forest Chief System based on a Tripartite Evolutionary Game
[目的]林长制在实施过程中既涉及纵向联动,也涉及横向协作。由于横向协作涉及到多方利益主体,主体间关系缺乏严格的上下级,横向协作相对更为困难,已成为制约林长制高效运行的主要瓶颈。因此,厘清各横向利益相关主体间的互动关系,推动建立横向协作机制,对于推深做实林长制具有重要现实意义。[方法]本文将林长制横向利益相关者划分为管理型利益相关者、监督型利益相关者和被动型利益相关者;基于利益相关者理论,构建理论分析框架,建立三方非对称动态演化博弈模型,通过对各方策略选择的演化稳定性和演化路径进行仿真分析。[结果]得出在林长制运行中各要素的作用机制,三方主体行为决策的博弈演化规律。[结论]结果表明:①推动林长制“有名有实”向“有能有效”转变的根本在于落实各方主体责任,确保各方主体满足参与约束与激励相容原则;②生态区位重要性、森林资源丰富度、林业产业发展水平是影响三方博弈主体行为决策,付出的成本、产生期望收益和社会效益的主要因素;③对管理型利益相关者,监督型利益相关者的林长制绩效考核制度与奖惩制度,以及对被动型利益相关者激励政策,有利于推进利益相关者主体横向协作的内生性集体行动;④由于部分被动型利益相关者游离在林长制组织体系外,如何调动他们的内生动力是加强林长制横向协作过程中需要着力解决的重要现实问题。
[Objective]The forest chief system involves vertical linkage and horizontal cooperation in the implementation process.Because horizontal cooperation involves multiple stakeholders,the relationship between the subjects lacks strict upper and lower levels,and horizontal cooperation is relatively more difficult,which has become the main bottleneck restricting the efficient operation of the forest chief system.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to clarify the interaction between the various horizontal stakeholders and promote the establishment of a horizontal cooperation mechanism..[Method]This paper divides the horizontal stakeholders of the forest chief system into management stakeholders,supervision stakeholders and passive stakeholders;based on the stakeholder theory,a theoretical analysis framework is constructed,and a three-party asymmetric dynamic evolutionary game model is established.The evolutionary stability and evolutionary path of each party's strategy selection are simulated and analyzed.[Result]The mechanism of action of each factor in the operation of the forest chief system and the game evolution law of the behavior decision of the three parties are obtained..[Conclusion]The results show that:1 The fundamental way to promote the transformation of the forest chief system from"famous and real"to"effective"lies in the implementation of the main responsibilities of all parties and ensuring that all parties meet the principles of participation,restraint and incentive compatibility.The importance of ecological location,the richness of forest resources and the development level of forestry industry are the main factors affecting the behavior decision-making,cost,expected income and social benefits of the three-party game players.Third,the performance appraisal system and reward and punishment system of the management stakeholders and the supervision stakeholders,as well as the incentive policy for the passive stakeholders,are conducive to promoting the endogenous collective action of the horizontal cooperation of the stakeholders.Because some passive stakeholders are outside the forest chief system,how to mobilize their endogenous power is an important practical problem to be solved in the process of strengthening the horizontal cooperation of the forest chief system.
李源;王超;梁越颖;徐斌;宁攸凉;
中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所,北京 100091;中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所,北京 100091;中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所,北京 100091;中国林业科学研究院,北京 100091;中国林业科学研究院林业科技信息研究所,北京 100091;
F326.2
stakeholder forest chief system tripartite evolutionary game operational mechanism collective action
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